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RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
 The issue in this case is whether the rejection of a 
policyholder’s proof of loss constituted a “written denial of 
all or part of the claim,” thereby triggering the one-year 
statute of limitations that is set forth in every Standard Flood 
Insurance Policy (“SFIP”). After receiving a payment from 
Fidelity National Indemnity Insurance Company, based on an 
adjuster’s assessment of the damage to his property caused by 
Hurricane Sandy, Anthony Migliaro submitted a sworn proof 
of loss seeking additional compensation. Fidelity sent 
Migliaro a letter rejecting his proof of loss, and he filed suit. 
The District Court found that the letter rejecting Migliaro’s 
proof of loss was a “written denial of all or part of the claim.” 
Since Migliaro filed his complaint almost two years after he 
received the letter, the District Court dismissed the suit as 
time-barred. We affirm the District Court’s order. Although 
the rejection of a proof of loss is not per se a denial of the 
claim in whole or in part, it does constitute a denial of the 
claim if, as here, the policyholder treats it as such by filing 
suit against the carrier.  
 
 
I. Background1 
A. The National Flood Insurance Program  
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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 Congress authorized the creation of the National Flood 
Insurance Program (“NFIP”) to “enable interested persons to 
purchase insurance against loss resulting from physical 
damage to or loss of . . . property . . . arising from any flood 
occurring in the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 4011(a). The 
NFIP is administered by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (“FEMA”). Id. Under FEMA’s Write Your Own 
program, individuals may purchase SFIPs from private 
insurance carriers (“WYO carriers”). 44 C.F.R. § 62.23.  
 
 The national flood insurance system is an unusual 
hybrid of government and private insurance, but it is 
essentially a government program. WYO carriers are “fiscal 
agents” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 4071(a)(1). SFIP 
policyholders pay premiums to WYO carriers and WYO 
carriers service the policies. 44 C.F.R. § 62.23(d). However, 
the United States government ultimately pays all SFIP claims. 
Van Holt v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 163 F.3d 161, 166 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (“[A]n insured’s flood insurance claims are 
ultimately paid by FEMA.”).2 In addition, although WYO 
                                              
2 More specifically, “WYO companies must . . . remit the 
insurance premiums to [FEMA]; however, the companies 
may keep funds required to meet current expenditures, which 
are limited to five thousand dollars. See 44 C.F.R. pt. 62, app. 
A., art. VII(B) (2016). When WYO companies deplete their 
net premium income, a phenomenon that occurs regularly 
because the companies must forfeit a significant portion of 
the proceeds from premiums, they draw money from FEMA 
through letters of credit to disburse claims. See 44 C.F.R. pt. 
62, app. A, art. IV(A). Thus, regardless whether FEMA or a 
WYO company issues a flood insurance policy, the United 
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carriers are also responsible for defending lawsuits arising 
under SFIPs, the United States government reimburses the 
cost of defending such claims. 44 C.F.R. §62.23(i)(6); Van 
Holt, 163 F.3d at 165 (“Although WYO companies have the 
responsibility of defending against claims, FEMA reimburses 
the WYO companies for their defense costs.”). Because SFIP 
claims are ultimately paid by the United States government, 
all SFIPs must be identical to the form codified at 44 C.F.R. 
pt. 61, app. A(1).3 Every SFIP contains the following statute-
of-limitations provision:  
 
You may not sue us to recover 
money under this policy unless 
you have complied with all the 
requirements of the policy. If you 
do sue, you must start the suit 
within one year after the date of 
the written denial of all or part of 
the claim[.] . . . This requirement 
applies to any claim that you may 
have under this policy and to any 
dispute that you may have arising 
out of the handling of any claim 
under the policy. 
                                                                                                     
States treasury funds pay off the insureds’ claims.” Van Holt, 
163 F.3d at 165.   
3 Although an SFIP may be modified with the “express 
written consent of the Federal Insurance Administrator,” 44 
C.F.R. pt. 61, app. A(1), art. VII(D), Migliaro’s SFIP was not 
modified.  
 
 6 
 
44 C.F.R. pt. 61, app. A(1), art VII(R) (emphasis added).  
  The SFIP and corresponding FEMA bulletins describe 
the SFIP claims process. After an SFIP policyholder suffers a 
loss, the WYO carrier sends an insurance adjuster to assess 
the damages. FEMA Bulletin W-12092a (Nov. 9, 2012). The 
adjuster then makes a recommendation as to the amount of 
money the policyholder is entitled to recover under the 
policy. Id. The WYO carrier typically adopts the adjuster’s 
recommendation and pays the policyholder the recommended 
amount. Id. If the policyholder’s coverage limits have not 
been exhausted and he believes he is entitled to recover more, 
he must send the carrier a proof of loss no later than a year 
and a half from the date of the loss. FEMA Bulletin W-
13060a (Oct. 1, 2013).4 A proof of loss is the policyholder’s 
signed and sworn estimate of the additional covered damages. 
44 C.F.R. pt. 61, app. A(1), art. VII(J)(4). The SFIP’s Loss 
Payment provision sets forth the options available to the 
policyholder if the proof of loss is rejected. See 44 C.F.R. pt. 
61, app. A(1), art. VII(M)(2).  
                                              
4 The claims process described in these FEMA bulletins 
differs slightly from the process described in the codified 
SFIP. While submission of a proof of loss within sixty days is 
typically a condition precedent to payment, see 44 C.F.R., pt. 
61, app. (a)(1), art. IX(J)(7), in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Sandy, FEMA temporarily modified the scheme in order to 
expedite the claims process and to give policyholders more 
time to submit an initial proof of loss. FEMA Bulletin W-
12092a (Nov. 9, 2012). Migliaro’s claim was governed by 
this modified scheme. 
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B. Factual Background 
Migliaro purchased an SFIP from WYO carrier 
Fidelity for his New Jersey property. The property sustained 
flood damage in October 2012 as a result of Hurricane Sandy. 
Fidelity sent an independent adjuster to assess the damage. 
The adjuster recommended a payment of $90,499.11. Fidelity 
adopted the adjuster’s recommendation and sent Migliaro a 
check for the recommended amount.5  
Five months later, Migliaro submitted a proof of loss, 
claiming an additional $236,702.57 in damages. On July 15, 
2013, Fidelity sent Migliaro a letter titled “Rejection of Proof 
of Loss.” A189. The letter read, in pertinent part:  
 
The Proof of Loss cannot be 
accepted under the terms and 
conditions of the insurance policy 
for the following reason:  
 
1. The amount claimed is not 
an accurate reflection of 
covered damage.  
 
                                              
5 Before the adjuster inspected the property, Migliaro had 
requested and received $35,000 in advance payments to cover 
the damage. The adjuster then inspected the property and 
submitted a report recommending a total payment of 
$90,449.11. Fidelity then paid Migliaro $55,449.11, the 
difference between the total covered damages and the 
$35,000 advanced to Migliaro.  
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This is not a denial of your claim. 
Your field adjuster provided you 
with an estimate and Proof of 
Loss regarding covered damages. 
If there are additional covered 
damages identified, please 
forward documentation and they 
will be considered on a 
supplemental basis and a new 
corrected estimate and a new 
Proof of Loss will be provided.  
 
A189. Migliaro did not provide additional documentation or 
otherwise attempt to submit a second proof of loss. Instead, 
he brought suit against Fidelity in federal court.  
 
C. Procedural Background 
 Migliaro initially filed suit in the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey on December 13, 2013, “to recover 
damages arising from Defendants’ unfair refusal to pay 
insurance benefits as represented by . . . the subject insurance 
policy Defendants sold to Plaintiff.” A208. In September 
2014, Migliaro filed a motion for voluntary dismissal under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The District Court granted the 
motion and dismissed Migliaro’s first complaint without 
prejudice. Migliaro filed a second complaint against Fidelity 
in the same court on July 22, 2015, alleging that Fidelity 
“ha[d] failed and refused to pay to Plaintiff those benefits due 
and owing under [the SFIP].” A4. 
 
Fidelity moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
the suit was barred by the SFIP’s one-year statute of 
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limitations. Fidelity urged that the July 15, 2013 letter 
rejecting Migliaro’s proof of loss was a “written denial of all 
or part of the claim,” which triggered the statute of 
limitations. Since Migliaro’s second complaint was filed 
almost two years after he received the letter, Fidelity argues 
that his claim was time-barred. In response, Migliaro argued 
that the letter rejecting his proof of loss was not a “written 
denial of all or part of the claim” because it explicitly said it 
was not a denial of his claim. According to Migliaro, he had 
never received a written denial of his claim, so the statute of 
limitations had never begun to run. The District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Fidelity. This timely appeal 
followed.  
 
 
II. Analysis6 
The issue here is whether Fidelity’s rejection of 
Migliaro’s proof of loss constituted a “written denial of all or 
part of the claim,” thereby triggering the SFIP’s one-year 
statute of limitations. As the District Court correctly noted, 
“The Third Circuit has not explicitly defined what qualifies as 
                                              
6 We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary 
judgment and apply the same standard the district court 
applies. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d 
Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We may 
affirm the decision of the District Court on any basis 
supported by the record. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 
245 (1937).  
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a written denial of a claim seeking benefits under the SFIP.” 
Migliaro v. Fidelity Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 15-5688, 
2017 WL 462631, at *2 (D.N. J. Feb. 3, 2017). Nor does it 
appear that any other federal court has done so.7 Given the 
language of the SFIP’s Loss Payment provision and the 
restrictions placed on a policyholder’s private right of action 
against a WYO carrier, we conclude that the written rejection 
of a proof of loss constitutes a denial of the claim if, based on 
it, the policyholder files suit against the WYO carrier, thereby 
accepting the written rejection of a proof of loss as a written 
denial of the claim.   
 
                                              
7 Both parties cite a number of cases in which courts have 
considered, on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular 
writing constituted a written denial of a claim. See, e.g., State 
Bank of Coloma v. Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, 851 F.2d 817, 
819 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that a letter offering to pay 50% 
of the claimed damages was a partial denial of the claim and 
triggered the statute of limitations); St. Germain Place 
Owners Ass’n Inc. v. Texas Farmers Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. G-
11-071, 2012 WL 2564441 (S.D. Tex. June 29, 2010) 
(finding that a letter offering to pay some of the claimed 
damages was a partial denial of the claim); House v. Bankers 
Ins. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (finding that a 
letter from a WYO carrier was not a denial of the claim). 
However, we are not aware of any case providing a generally 
applicable definition of “written denial of all or part of the 
claim.” Nor are we aware of any case in which the court has 
categorically determined whether the rejection of a proof of 
loss constitutes a “written denial of all or part of the claim.”  
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At the outset, we reject Fidelity’s argument that the 
rejection of a proof of loss is per se a denial of the claim. 
Fidelity’s argument hinges on the SFIP’s Loss Payment 
provision, 44 C.F.R. pt. 61, app. A(1), art. VII(M)(2), which 
reads in pertinent part: 
 
 2. If we reject your proof of loss in whole or in part 
you may:  
  a. Accept our denial of your claim  
  b. Exercise your rights under this policy; or  
c. File an amended proof of loss as long as it is 
filed within 60 days of the date of the loss.  
Id. Fidelity reasons that, since subsection (a) equates a 
rejection of a proof of loss with a denial of the claim, a 
rejection of a proof of loss is per se a denial of the claim.  
But Fidelity misreads the Loss Payment provision. 
Under it, (a) is just one of three options a policyholder has 
after his proof of loss has been rejected. He need not accept 
the rejection as a denial of his claim. Alternatively, under 
option (b) he may exercise his rights under the SFIP. These 
include the right to demand an appraisal of the loss (44 C.F.R. 
pt. 61, app. A(1), art. VII(P)), the right to cancel the policy 
(44 C.F.R. pt. 61, app. A(1), art. VII(E)), and the right to file 
suit “within one year after the date of the written denial of all 
or part of the claim” (44 C.F.R. pt. 61, app. A(1), art. VII(R)). 
Finally, option (c) allows the policyholder to file an amended 
proof of loss and attempt to show the WYO carrier that he is 
indeed entitled to additional compensation.  
Migliaro urged that he exercised his rights under 
option (b) by bringing suit against Fidelity (See Tr. Oral Arg. 
at 11:35-11:50), and therefore since the provision is in the 
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disjunctive, he did not choose option (a) and accept the 
rejection as a denial of his claim. But, in so arguing, Migliaro 
necessarily admits that he viewed the July 15, 2013 letter 
rejecting his proof of loss as a written denial of his claim. 
This is because the private right of action against a WYO 
carrier is limited to a suit challenging the complete or partial 
denial of his claim. Therefore, the very act of bringing suit 
signaled that, to Migliaro’s mind, his claim had been denied. 
Second, by statute the policyholder’s cause of action arises 
“upon the disallowance . . . of any [SFIP] claim, or upon the 
refusal of the claimant to accept the amount allowed upon any 
such claim.” 42 U.S.C. § 4072. The only communication of 
the disallowance was the written rejection of the proof of loss 
in the July 15 letter. Thus, by filing suit, Migliaro himself 
held out the July 15 letter rejecting his proof of loss as a 
denial of his claim. He cannot now argue otherwise.  
When Congress created the NFIP, its authorization of 
policyholders to sue FEMA upon disallowance of their claims 
constituted a limited waiver of the sovereign immunity 
typically enjoyed by the federal agency. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 
U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity 
shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”). 
We must interpret this waiver of sovereign immunity—and 
the cause of action authorized under it—narrowly. See Lane 
v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (a waiver of sovereign 
immunity must be “strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in 
favor of the sovereign”). We cannot “enlarge the waiver 
beyond what the language requires.” Library of Congress v. 
Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 381 (1986) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Strictly construed, 42 U.S.C. § 4072 provides a 
limited right to sue upon the disallowance of all or part of a 
claim, i.e. the complete or partial denial of a claim. 
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An SFIP policyholder is limited to bringing a suit 
against the WYO carrier if he desires to challenge the denial 
of his claim. Under the WYO program, WYO carriers stand 
in FEMA’s shoes for litigation purposes. When Congress 
authorized a private right of action to challenge the denial of a 
claim in 42 U.S.C. § 4072, it only referred to suits against 
FEMA. But Congress also charged FEMA with implementing 
the NFIP, and it authorized the agency to promulgate 
regulations and to utilize private insurance companies as 
fiscal agents of the United States in order to do so. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4011, 4019, 4041, 4071. Pursuant to this authority, FEMA 
created the WYO program. 44 C.F.R. § 62.23. In so doing, it 
authorized WYO carriers to stand in FEMA’s shoes for 
purposes of issuing and servicing SFIPs and, importantly, for 
defending lawsuits arising under SFIPs. See 44 C.F.R. § 
61.13(f) (“Policies issued by WYO Companies may be 
executed by the issuing WYO Company as Insurer, in the 
place and stead of [FEMA].”); 44 C.F.R. § 62.23(g) (“WYO 
Companies are solely responsible for their obligations to their 
insured under any flood insurance policies[,] . . . such that the 
Federal Government is not a proper party defendant in any 
lawsuit arising out of such policies”). Because a suit against a 
WYO company is the “functional equivalent of a suit against 
FEMA,” Van Holt, 163 F.3d at 166, an SFIP policyholder 
may only bring a suit against the WYO carrier.  
Moreover, the United States government bears 
ultimate financial responsibility for all SFIP claims, 
regardless of whether FEMA or a WYO carrier has issued the 
policy. We must carefully “observe the conditions defined by 
Congress for charging the public treasury,” Fed. Crop Ins. 
Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384-85 (1947), and “when 
dealing with a statute subjecting the Government to liability 
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for potentially great sums of money, [we] must not promote 
profligacy by careless construction[,]” Indian Towing Co. v. 
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955). Therefore, restrictions 
on a policyholder’s right of action against FEMA apply with 
equal force to suits against WYO carriers. See Flick v. Liberty 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 386, 394 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“Because flood losses, whether insured by FEMA or by a 
participating WYO insurer, are paid out of the [United States 
Treasury], a claimant under a standard flood insurance policy 
must comply strictly with the terms and conditions that 
Congress has established for payment.”); Suopys v. Omaha 
Prop. & Cas., 404 F.3d 805, 809 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Because 
any claim paid by a WYO Company is a direct charge to the 
United States Treasury, strict adherence to the conditions 
precedent to payment is required.”).  
Because the only suit a policyholder can bring against 
a WYO carrier is one challenging the denial of his claim, by 
bringing suit on December 13, 2013, Migliaro necessarily 
acknowledged that Fidelity had denied his claim. To the 
extent that Migliaro’s suit was based upon something other 
than the denial of his claim, it would have also been properly 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because there is no waiver 
of sovereign immunity except for the causes of action 
provided for in the statute.8 See United States v. Dalm, 494 
                                              
8 For example, Migliaro has suggested that his suit was based 
upon a wrongful denial of his proof of loss, common law 
breach of contract, or a breach of the covenant of bad faith. 
See Tr. Oral Arg. at 40:56-41:11 (characterizing the cause of 
action as the “failure to honor proof of loss as it was 
submitted”); Oral Argument at 5:55-7:12; 38:25-39:15 
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U.S. 596, 608 (1990) (“[T]he United States, as sovereign, is 
immune from suit, save as it consents to be sued . . . and the 
terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s 
jurisdiction to entertain the suit.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
A policyholder must also wait until his claim has been 
denied before he can file suit against a WYO carrier. 
According to the SFIP, “If you do sue, you must start the suit 
within one year after the date of the written denial of all or 
part of the claim[.]” 44 C.F.R. pt. 61, app. A(1), art. VII(R) 
(emphasis added). For the same reasons that we must 
narrowly construe the type of suit a policyholder may bring 
against a WYO carrier, we must also narrowly construe when 
a policyholder may bring suit. See Block v. North Dakota, 461 
U.S. 273, 287 (1983) (“When Congress attaches conditions to 
legislation waiving the sovereign immunity of the United 
States, those conditions must be strictly observed, and 
exceptions thereto are not to be lightly implied.”). Narrowly 
interpreted, this clause provides that a policyholder may not 
bring suit against a WYO carrier until after his claim has been 
denied in writing.  
Because a policyholder cannot bring suit until his 
claim has been denied in writing, Migliaro must have 
accepted that this had occurred when he brought suit. The 
                                                                                                     
(“We’re basing [the suit] upon a breach of contract. We’re not 
basing it upon a denial of a claim.”); Br. for Appellant 25-27 
(arguing that his claim should be allowed to proceed based on 
a theory of bad faith and unfair dealing). As noted, however, 
there is no waiver of sovereign immunity in connection with 
these common law claims.  
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only writing in the record that Migliaro could have construed 
as a denial of his claim was the July 15, 2013 letter rejecting 
his proof of loss. Thus, by bringing suit, Migliaro 
acknowledged that the letter constituted a written denial of his 
claim.  
Migliaro’s pleadings bear out this characterization of 
his suit as one challenging the denial of his claim. His 
complaint alleged that, “despite demand for benefits under its 
policy of insurance, [Fidelity] failed and refused to pay 
benefits due and owing under said policy[.]” A4. Surely this 
is the same as saying that his claim was denied in whole or in 
part.  
 Finally, we note Migliaro’s contention that, even if a 
rejected proof of loss could constitute a denial of the claim, 
his particular rejection letter did not because it stated that it 
was “not a denial of [the] claim.” A189. We do not agree. 
Given the language of the Loss Payment provision, the 
statement was technically true at the time it was made. At that 
time, the door to additional compensation for his claim 
remained open. In the July 15 letter, Fidelity actually invited 
him to submit additional documentation to support his initial 
proof of loss. Also, by law he had the right to seek an 
appraisal of the loss or file an amended proof of loss within 
sixty days. 44 C.F.R. pt. 61, app. A(1), art. VII(M)(2). But 
Migliaro closed the door by failing to seek an appraisal, file 
an amended proof of loss within sixty days, or submit 
additional documentation. Instead, he sued, and in doing so 
acknowledged that, by virtue of the letter rejecting his proof 
of loss, his claim had been denied.  
Migliaro takes the position that because the rejection 
letter stated that it was not a denial, the statute of limitations 
never commenced to run. He effectively claims an open-
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ended right to file suit. But his position is undercut by his 
own conduct—he brought suit because his claim was denied. 
Thus, because Migliaro’s second complaint was filed almost 
two years after he received the July 15, 2013 letter, his suit 
was properly dismissed as time-barred.9  
 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment.  
                                              
9 It is of no moment that Migliaro’s first complaint was timely 
and was dismissed without prejudice. Cardio-Med Assocs. v. 
Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 721 F.2d 68, 77 (3d Cir. 1983) (it 
is a “well recognized principle that a statute of limitations is 
not tolled by the filing of a complaint subsequently dismissed 
without prejudice. As regards the statute of limitations, the 
original complaint is treated as if it never existed”).  
 
